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ARTICLES

SOVEREIGN METAPHORS IN INDIAN LAW
Gregory Ablavsky*

I. INTRODUCTION
The status of Native nations under federal law, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated, is unique. “The condition of the Indians in relation to the
United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence,”
Chief Justice Marshall announced in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia;1 it was
“marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.”2
Fifty years later, Justice Miller reiterated Marshall’s point: “The relation of
the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States . . . to the
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one, and of
complex character.”3
Anomalous compared to what? Marshall’s statements came in a paragraph that sought to explain why the “term foreign nation,” which, Marshall
noted, might ordinarily be thought to apply to tribes, did not.4 Similarly,
Justice Miller’s assertion came as he attempted to puzzle through Native
nations’ “difficult to define” position within Anglo-American jurispru* Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; J.D./Ph.D., American Legal History, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Michael Abrams and the staff of the Crown Law Library for research
assistance on this Article.
1. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
2. Id. at 16.
3. United States v. Kagama, 188 U.S. 375, 381 (1886). On the persistence of exceptionalist narratives within Indian law, see Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,
119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 433 (2005); Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry
into Extra-Constitutionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 173 (Apr. 2017).
4. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
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dence.5 “They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semiindependent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,
but as a separate people.”6
As these quotes suggest, the status of Native nations within federal law
has almost always been defined with reference to other sovereigns. In this
Article, I explore the comparisons between “Indian tribes” and the other
sovereigns mentioned in the U.S. Constitution: foreign nations, states, and
the U.S. territories. In each instance, I examine the analogies’ function in
the historical growth and development of federal Indian law as well as in
current jurisprudence.
This exploration reveals that tribes were not as anomalous as the Court
has suggested. Even while the Court proclaimed the tribes’ uniqueness, it
readily applied doctrines developed in the context of foreign nations, states,
and U.S. territories to Native nations straight up, ignoring the differences
between the situation of tribes and other sovereigns. The Court continues to
engage in this practice in the present. Yet these invocations of other sovereigns have usually served a particular purpose: either to cabin the scope of
tribal authority or to aggrandize federal power. It is only when doctrines
derived from other sovereigns might benefit tribes—might suggest a
broader scope for tribal authority or capacity—that tribes become exceptional and anomalous. In these instances, as Marshall and Miller’s quotes
demonstrate, tribes become defined by what they are not—their differences
from other sovereigns now serve to justify diminishing tribal authority.
Rhetoric about tribes’ uniqueness, in other words, has provided a powerful
and ongoing ideological tool in constructing U.S. colonialism over Native
peoples. This narrative about what tribes lack when compared to other sovereigns—full sovereignty, territorial control, open citizenship, constitutional status—has become a constant, and pernicious, trope within the discourse of Indian law.
II. FOREIGN NATIONS
A. Historically
“Nations” is arguably the oldest legal frame Europeans used for indigenous peoples, tracing back to the very beginning of colonization.7 Although the word’s connotations of unity and centralized political organization poorly fit the complex Native world of villages and loose confedera5.
6.
7.
77–109

Kagama, 188 U.S. at 381.
Id.
See KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN, INDIANS
(2000).
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tions,8 it accurately conveyed a sense of Native separateness and autonomy
from Europeans. This frame allowed Europeans to extrapolate to Native
peoples the legal instruments that they had long used to govern relationships among “nations”—formal, written treaties, most notably.9 For their
part, Native communities engaged in the same project, readily assimilating
Europeans into the legal forms and customs they used to structure crosscultural diplomacy.10
But, while Native nationhood provided Europeans a ready legal frame
for their relationship with indigenous communities, it also had implications
at odds with their colonial aims. In particular, it suggested that Native nations, as separate, independent polities, existed outside the jurisdiction and
control of Europeans. Early on, many Europeans began to craft legal theories that resisted this conclusion, and that would serve as the basis for
claiming authority over both Native lands and peoples.11 These conflicting
ideas—of Natives as autonomous nations and as subordinate communities
subject to European control—clashed within European legal thought
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even as most Native
communities in fact remained outside European authority.12
The United States inherited this duality of legal thought. The new nation initially made an abortive attempt to resolve the tension produced by
Native independence by labelling the Native peoples within its new borders
as “conquered,” and so subject to the jurisdiction of both state and federal
governments.13 This claim failed spectacularly, spawning wars that the new
nation could ill-afford.14 A chastened Washington Administration quickly
retreated, with Secretary of War Henry Knox proclaiming that “independent
nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not
8. See generally MICHAEL J. WITGEN, AN INFINITY OF NATIONS: HOW THE NATIVE NEW WORLD
SHAPED EARLY NORTH AMERICA (2012); STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE CREEK NATION,
1670–1763 (2004).
9. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, PEN AND INK WITCHCRAFT: TREATIES AND TREATY MAKING IN
AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY (2013).
10. E.g., JAMES H. MERRELL, INTO THE AMERICAN WOODS: NEGOTIATORS ON THE PENNSYLVANIA
FRONTIER (2000); ROBERT A WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS
OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800 (1997).
11. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, 95–132 (2010); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN
IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Daragh Grant, The Treaty of
Hartford (1638): Reconsidering Jurisdiction in Southern New England, 72 WM. & MARY Q. 461 (2015).
12. See GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR UNDER HEAVEN: PONTIAC, THE INDIAN NATIONS & THE
BRITISH EMPIRE 174–211 (2002) (tracing debates over Native status in the British Empire after the
Seven Years’ War).
13. James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations in the New Nation, in
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987).
14. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1018–33 (2014).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2019

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-1\MON101.txt

14

unknown

Seq: 4

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

15-MAY-19

9:17

Vol. 80

as the subjects of any particular state.”15 The new federal government employed this legal frame by maintaining the diplomatic and legal norms acknowledging Native nationhood adopted by earlier empires.
Yet, as I have explored more fully elsewhere, recognizing Native peoples as fully sovereign, independent nations within the United States conflicted with the new nation’s own assertions of territorial sovereignty.16 Native peoples, Anglo-Americans concluded, had to be subject to U.S. sovereignty in some fashion.17 Moreover, as colonization proceeded and Native
nations east of the Mississippi became increasingly subject to federal power
as a matter of fact, many Anglo-Americans vociferously argued that the
model of Native nationhood was archaic and should be dispensed with altogether.18
The confrontation between the nationhood frame, with its recognition
of Native rights to autonomy, and the longstanding view that Native peoples were merely the subjects of the colonizing power, was at the core of
the legal and jurisdictional battle known as Removal, which sought to resolve centuries of swirling debates over Native status. Southern states, eager to possess Native lands, insisted that tribes were subject, like all others,
to state and federal territorial jurisdiction: they enacted a series of laws that
purported to legislate for Indian country within their borders, as part of their
ordinary legislative jurisdiction.19 Native peoples and their allies, by contrast, argued that the tribes remained independent nations, a status that they
insisted had been repeatedly recognized and endorsed by the federal government.20
The contest produced Chief Justice John Marshall’s attempt to parse
the meaning of Native nationhood in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.21 Marshall at once acknowledged that the Cherokee Nation was a separate state,
governed by its own laws, and denied that it was a “foreign nation” for the
purposes of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III.22
15. Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 134, 134–40 (W. W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1987).
16. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1061–68
(2015).
17. See id.
18. E.g., Letter from Andrew Jackson to James Monroe (Mar. 4, 1817), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON: MAIN SERIES 93, 96 (“If [Indians] are viewed as an independent Nation, possessing the
right of sovereignity and domain, then negotiating with them and concluding treaties, would be right and
proper. But this is not the fact—all Indians within the Territorial limits of the United States, are considered subject to its sovereignty, and have only a possessory right to the soil.”).
19. See, e.g., 1826 Ga. Laws 68; 1827 Ga. Laws 99–101; 1827 Ga. Laws 236; 1828 Ga. Laws
87–88; 1830 Ga. Laws 154; 1830 Ga. Laws 127; 1830 Ga. Laws 114.
20. See THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE TRAIL OF TEARS
69–89 (2007).
21. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
22. Id. at 17–18.
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Because the Cherokee Nation was within the borders of the United States
and did not participate in the community of nations, he reasoned, it could
not be foreign.23 Tribes, rather, were, “domestic dependent nations,” a neologism Marshall coined by repurposing the era’s international-law
thought.24
On its face, Marshall’s phrase encapsulated, rather than resolved, earlier tensions. As Marshall’s subsequent decision in Worcester v. Georgia25
made clear, “domestic dependent nations” retained jurisdictional autonomy
from the states.26 His language there reaffirmed the vitality of the analogy
between Native and foreign nations: treaty and nation, he noted, had “definite and well understood meaning[s]” that the United States had applied “to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are
applied to all in the same sense.”27 Yet Marshall could not undo the implications of his earlier pronouncement: subsequent decisions would place
considerably more emphasis on dependency than nationhood. Little more
than a decade after Marshall’s decision, the Court, in upholding federal
power to regulate Indian country in United States v. Rogers,28 dubiously
concluded that Native peoples “have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments.”29
Rogers augured a clear shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, away from
international law and toward positive law as embodied by congressional
legislation as the principal source of law in Indian affairs. By the time of the
Civil War, an increasingly emboldened Congress was routinely enacting
statutes that expanded federal authority ever further into Native self-governance. In 1871, in the midst of a struggle between the Senate and the House,
Congress enacted a law stating, “hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within
the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation . . . with whom the United States may contract by
treaty.”30 This move, while practically insignificant, was symbolically important in ratifying the shift in thinking about tribal status from foreign to
domestic. By 1886, when the Kagama Court affirmed Congress’s broad
power to legislate over Indians, any suggestion of Native autonomy based
on nationhood was swept away.31 Tribes were, the Court acknowledged, “a
23. Id.
24. Id. at 17.
25. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 519.
28. 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846).
29. Id.
30. Act of Mar. 8, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871); see also Lance Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 69, 105–11 (2017) (describing the legislative
history of this provision).
31. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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separate people” with limited powers of self-governance, but this separateness did not bar Congress from asserting jurisdiction through ordinary legislation.32 On the contrary, the tribes’ status as distinct from the states, the
Court reasoned, bolstered the congressional claim to authority, given the
nation’s obligation to protect its Native wards.33
By the late nineteenth century, then, the analogy between Native communities and foreign nations, which had done so much work in earlier legal
thought, played little role in the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence. The older
decisions endured as a matter of positive law, yet the Court glossed over
their sources and reasoning. The Kagama Court, for instance, relied extensively on both Cherokee Nation and Worcester, which it described as the
“best statement[s]” on Native status—yet it read the former primarily as an
articulation of Native dependence and the latter for establishing the principle of exclusive federal, rather than state, jurisdiction over Indian affairs.34
“The North American Indians do not, and never have, constituted ‘nations’
as that word is used by writers upon international law,” the Court opined in
1901.35 Pontificating at length on the “natural infirmities of the Indian character” and tribes’ supposed lack of government, the Court concluded: “In
short, the word ‘nation’ as applied to the uncivilized Indians is so much of a
misnomer as to be little more than a compliment.”36
But there was one exception to the Court’s general retreat from thinking about Indian law as a form of foreign relations law—a subset of cases
dealing with congressional power to abrogate Indian treaties. Beginning
with Cherokee Tobacco37 in 1870 and culminating with Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock38 in 1903, the Court affirmed that, with respect to congressional authority, Indian treaties were to be regarded no differently than treaties with
foreign nations. Both, the Court concluded, were subject to abrogation by
statute under the last-in-time principle.39 This tidy analogy ignored how
much the Court’s abandonment of conceptions of tribes as foreign nations
had altered the jurisprudential landscape. The relationship between the
United States and foreign nations, the Court had reasoned in upholding the
congressional power to abrogate, was “reciprocal”: if the United States
opted to break a treaty, the other nation “may also decline to keep the corresponding engagement.”40 But tribes, no longer fully autonomous actors
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 381–83.
Id. at 381–84.
Id.
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901).
Id.
78 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1870).
187 U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903).
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 620–21; Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565–67.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 601 (1889).
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under federal law, were now unambiguously under federal jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, then, federal courts held that tribes lacked the power to abrogate the treaties they had entered with the United States, since those treaties
had become part of binding federal law.41
In other words, by the late nineteenth century, tribes and foreign nations really were differently situated, largely as a consequence of the
Court’s own rulings. Yet in this one small corner of Indian law jurisprudence, the Court continued to uphold the analogy between the two. The
comparison no longer served to advance tribal autonomy and jurisdictional
independence, though, as it had done in the days of Marshall and the struggle over Removal. Rather, assimilating the status of tribes and foreign nations for the purposes of federal law now served only as the justification for
eliminating one of the last few extant barriers over unbridled federal power
in Indian country.
B. Today
Over the twentieth century, federal Indian law persisted in its abandonment of its international-law origins; it had become firmly, and solely, a
“domestic” concern. Even the decisions most protective of tribal autonomy
depicted the comparison to foreign nations as a thing of the past: “Originally,” the Court stated in Williams v. Lee,42 the tribal victory often described as the foundation of modern Indian law jurisprudence, “the Indian
tribes were separate nations within what is now the United States.”43 Most
cases, including Williams, relied on concepts of federal preemption of state
action to protect Native autonomy.44 This doctrinal perspective guarded
against state encroachment, but did little to protect tribes against federal
erosions, particularly from the Supreme Court. For the current Court, the
idea that tribes might be akin to foreign nations is unthinkable. It has routinely stripped tribes of rights of territorial jurisdiction that would be obvious, even banal, in the context of a foreign nation, but that the Court nonetheless deemed “incompatible” with the tribes’ “dependent” status.45 While
the Court acknowledges Indian law’s roots in “military and foreign policy,”
it does so largely to uphold expansive federal power.46 And even this position is controversial: tribes, Justice Thomas has opined, “never fit comforta41. See Whitmire v. Cherokee Nation, 30 Ct. Cl. 138, 157 (1895) (holding a tribe’s national council
“can not control or abrogate the treaty obligations of the nation to the United States”).
42. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id. at 219–20.
45. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
46. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 208 (1982 ed.)).
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bly within the category of foreign nations,” before pointing to the 1871 Act
ending treatymaking as evidence that the political branches “no longer considered the tribes to be anything like foreign nations.”47
Yet, as in the late nineteenth century, there is a glaring exception to
this rule—the Court’s current case law on tribal sovereign immunity. In
these cases, the Court has struggled to reconcile its constitutional-law decisions that gave sweeping scope to state immunity, its statutory decisions
that gave Congress authority over foreign sovereign immunity, and its common-law rulings on tribal immunity. In deciding how to characterize tribal
immunity, the Justices repeatedly argued that tribes were more similarly
situated to foreign nations: they could not enjoy the “sister state” exception
to sovereign immunity, for instance;48 their immunity could be freely altered by Congress;49 and, according to some Justices, they should be subject
to a “commercial activity” exception.50
The most sustained use of the metaphor, though, came in the recent
case of Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren,51 where the Tribe invoked
its immunity to attempt to bar a quiet title suit concerning recently purchased off-reservation property.52 The Lundgrens argued that tribal immunity was subject to the “immovable property exception”—a concept with
deep roots in international law that a sovereign is subject to suit concerning
land owned within another’s dominion.53 Although the majority remanded
the case to assess this question, the analogy garnered support from Chief
Justice Roberts, who concurred,54 and particularly from Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Alito, who dissented at length.55
The case, and Thomas’s arguments in particular, represented a striking
return to a much earlier era of Indian-law reasoning. Like Marshall’s decisions nearly two centuries earlier, Thomas’s opinion was replete with citations to hoary international-law treatises by Bynkershoek and Henry Wheaton; for the first time since Worcester, the Court directly cited to the influential eighteenth-century scholar Emer de Vattel in an Indian law case.56
The weight of this precedent was intended to demonstrate how deeply
47. Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
49. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
50. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indians, 498 U.S. 505, 515 (1991)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2047–48 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
51. 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1654.
54. Id. at 1655–66 (Roberts, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1656–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1657–85. Vattel briefly appeared within a quotation from Chancellor Kent in a latenineteenth-century Indian law decision by the Court, Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 301 (1896).
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rooted the immovable property exception had been in early internationallaw thought.
The Lundgren Court’s revival of the foreign nation analogy was
deeply ironic. For over a century, the Supreme Court had denied Native
nations the protections of international law on the theory that they were not
foreign, and, increasingly, that they were not really nations.57 In the reverse
situation, for instance—states claiming property rights within Indian country—the Court did not even seem to consider the application of the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity, likely because those lands
had been rendered “domestic.”58 As in the late nineteenth century, then, the
Court selectively revived the analogy to foreign nations only to weaponize
it against Native peoples.
Yet Lundgren also points toward a larger truth. The Court often acts
and speaks as if the analogy between tribes and foreign nations is rooted
firmly in the past, an archaism rendered irrelevant by changed circumstances, as if the legal transformations that happened in the late nineteenth
century were irrevocable rather than the legal and policy reflections of a
particularly imperialist era. But as Lundgren suggests, the primary barrier to
invoking the analogy in contemporary law is the Court itself. The Court
has, after all, reversed benighted holdings of the late nineteenth century
before, even when they claimed to be rooted in the Constitution.59 Moreover, treating the tribes as akin to foreign nations arguably has a particularly
strong claim to positive law under originalist constitutional interpretations.60
What would it look like to take the analogy between Native and foreign nations seriously in current law? It would not necessarily imply that
Indian country would cease to be part of the United States and become fully
independent: analogies do not require equivalence. But it might mean that
the Supreme Court would look to international law—either contemporary
or at the time of the Constitution’s adoption—as a source to puzzle through
Native status, as it once did, and, as Lundgren demonstrates, it can readily
do again. It would almost certainly point toward greater tribal autonomy
from other jurisdictions, particularly states, as Worcester suggests—a case
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly and unpersuasively sought to distinguish away.61 Perhaps most significantly, it would require the Court to ac57. See Section II. A., supra.
58. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
59. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999) (abrogating Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896),
as resting on a “false premise”).
60. See generally Ablavsky, supra note 16, at 1053–87.
61. Justice Scalia, for instance, argued that Worcester “must be considered in light of the fact that
‘[t]he 1828 treaty with the Cherokee Nation . . . guaranteed the Indians their lands would never be
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knowledge the term “nation” within Justice Marshall’s formulation, instead
of sweeping it aside in favor of an exclusive reliance on ideas of domesticity and dependence. As Marshall acknowledged and emphasized, nationhood implied both rights and dignity, a perspective that this current
Court has all but abandoned.
III. STATES
A. Historically
If foreign nations were the first sovereign to which tribes could be
compared, the American Revolution and the constitutional entrenchment of
federalism created another: states. The appeal of this analogy lay in its potential to resolve some of the paradoxes created by comparing Native with
foreign nations. If Native polities were fully sovereign nations, then it
would be difficult to understand how they could also be part of the territory
of another sovereign nation, the United States. But federalism, with its concept of divisible sovereignty, offered a potential resolution to this conflict.
States, after all, were firmly within the borders of the United States, and yet
considered sovereign. If Native peoples were more akin to states, they could
at once be sovereign and yet subordinate to the federal government.62 This
was particularly true in the area of foreign affairs, where the early United
States was especially eager to limit Native autonomy.
In this sense, statehood and “domestic dependent nationhood” bore a
certain resemblance. As conceived of in the antebellum United States, both
derived from a domesticated form of international law principles, and both
implied that sovereigns subject to overarching federal authority nonetheless
retained those rights not ceded to the federal government.63 For this reason,
federalism has long been one of the most appealing and enduring metaphors
for scholars and commentators looking for models for the relationship between tribes, states, and the federal government.64
subjected to the jurisdiction of any State or Territory.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362 n.4 (2001)
(quoting Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 71 (1962)). Yet, not only did Worcester not
discuss or rely on this treaty language, later post-Removal treaties contained nearly identical language.
See infra n.76.
62. Ablavsky, supra note 16, at 1075–77; see also Gregory Evans Dowd, Indigenous Peoples Without the Republic, 104 J. AM. HIST. 19, 36–38 (2017).
63. Of course, tribes, unlike states, did not ratify the Constitution and so did not actually cede any
rights. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896).
64. For works invoking this metaphor, see Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian
Tribes: The Relationship between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989); Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists,
62 DRAKE L. REV. 775 (2014); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within
Our Federalism: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006); Carol Tebben,
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Early on, many Anglo-Americans, picking up on this similarity, began
floating the possibility that Native nations might become states not merely
in a metaphorical sense but literally—that is, that Native nations might be
admitted as states into the union. The very first Indian treaty that the United
States entered, the 1778 treaty with the Delawares, contained a provision
suggesting that the Delawares should gather other “friend[ly]” tribes and
then “join the present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress.”65
Although some commentators have dismissed this provision as motivated
by wartime exigencies, it fits with the capacious imaginings of the union of
many early American leaders, who easily anticipated enfolding Quebec or
the Caribbean as states.66 The treaty’s provision promising congressional
representation reappeared in treaties concluded after the Revolution.67
Some observers thought some Native leaders shared this aim: one Virginian
thought that Alexander McGillivray, a Creek leader who used an alliance
with Spain to resist U.S. expansion, aimed at forcing the United States to
“admit them [the Creek nation] as a member of the federal Union.”68
Although nothing came of these early proposals, they prefigured debates about the relationship between Native nations and states during the
fights over Removal. While, as discussed in the prior section, Removal’s
opponents likened Native peoples to foreign nations, Removal’s proponents
viewed them through the lens of statehood. For them, the similarity between
Native nations and states presented both a problem and its potential solution. A problem, because those urging Removal regarded Native peoples as
states’ rivals for sovereignty and jurisdiction: Native nations were too akin
to states to coexist within the same territory. This was particularly true of
the so-called “civilized” tribes of the Southeast, which, in their push to acculturate, had established institutions nearly indistinguishable from those of
surrounding states. The written constitutions of the Cherokees, Creeks, and
others created Native legislatures, two-tiered courts, and an executive.69
White southerners found this parallel too close for comfort, and began arguing that Native nations constituted “new states” within their boundaries, a
contradiction forbidden under the U.S. Constitution.70
American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
318 (2002).
65. Treaty with the Delawares, art. VI, Delaware Nation-U.S., Sep. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
66. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI.
67. Treaty of Hopewell, Cherokee Nation-U.S., art. XII, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, 20.
68. Letter from Arthur Campbell to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 16, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS 333–34 (Henry W. Flournoy ed., 1884).
69. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENTS AMONG THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE CHICKASAW, AND THE CREEK (1992).
70. Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 129 YALE L.J. at *69–*70
(forthcoming 2019).
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Yet statehood also seemed to offer a solution to the ambiguities of
Native status. In 1834, President Jackson’s allies in Congress introduced a
bill that would have organized Native nations removed west of the Mississippi into a federal territory, under a federally appointed governor.71 Because every federal territory was understood to be on the path toward statehood, this bill raised the prospect, as its backers urged, that the tribes might
eventually “be admitted as a State to become a member of the Union.”72
This proposal met considerable opposition. John Quincy Adams thought it
exceeded congressional authority and would “totally . . . change the relations of the Indian tribes to this country.”73 For others, the prospect of an
Indian state conflicted with the country’s character as a white nation: it was
a proposal to “add to our Union men of blood and color alien to the people
of the United States,” one southern congressman warned, which might soon
lead to the statehood of “our brethren of Cuba and Hayti” (both predominantly black), as well as the free black colony in Liberia.74 For their part,
Native leaders were also opposed to the proposal, which would at once have
expanded federal authority in Indian country and replaced tribal governments with a pan-tribal legislature.75 In the face of opposition from multiple
directions, the bill failed. Though efforts to create a federally sponsored
pan-tribal government sporadically recurred throughout the nineteenth century, they suffered similar results.
The failure of these proposals to create a Native state doomed what
Removal’s proponents had touted as the primary legal benefit of pushing
Native peoples beyond the Mississippi: the resolution of the conflict between tribal and state authority. Removed tribes would be placed on federal
lands outside state borders; the dubiously secured treaties that the federal
government had used to force tribes westward promised that the tribes’ new
lands would never “be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of
any State.”76 But, as Removal’s opponents foresaw, these guarantees
proved worthless as the non-Native population of the United States swelled
and expanded. Native nations west of the Mississippi soon found themselves repeatedly enfolded within the borders of newly created states,
71. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 302–09 (1984); see also RONALD N. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA (1974).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 474, at 14 (1834).
73. 6 REG. DEB. 1063 (1830); 10 REG. DEB. 4770 (1834).
74. 10 REG. DEB. at 4776–77.
75. See PRUCHA, supra note 71 at 302–09.
76. Treaty of New Echota, art. 5., Cherokee Nation-U.S., Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478; see also
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, art. IV, Choctaw Nation-U.S., Sep. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333; Treaty of
Pontotoc Creek, Chickasaw Nation-U.S., Oct. 20, 1832, 7 Stat. 381.
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quickly recapitulating the jurisdictional conflicts between Native and state
sovereignty at the core of the fights over Removal.77
Ultimately, this process played out for the removed tribes in Indian
Territory as well. In the late nineteenth century, Congress abandoned the
earlier vision of the Territory as a separate homeland for Native peoples; it
opened large portions of the Territory for white settlement and moved toward the creation of a single territory, Oklahoma, that would ultimately be
admitted as a state.78 Faced with the prospect that they would become a
minority in a white-dominated state, some leaders of the Five Civilized
Tribes pushed to create their own separate state, Sequoyah, from the eastern
portion of the territory.79 Although similar to the prior century’s proposal
for an Indian state, Sequoyah would be Native only in its demographics:
like every other state, Sequoyah’s borders, jurisdiction, and citizenship
would be defined by territory, not Indian status.80 In shedding any aspect of
the structures and protections of Indian law, Sequoyah represented the ultimate triumph of the statehood model for Indian country, embraced largely
out of desperation as one of the only viable avenues to preserve Native
autonomy. Nonetheless, the push for statehood failed, largely as a result of
partisan politics. Congress feared admitting a state dominated, not by
“alien[s],” but by Democrats.81
One of the ironic consequences of Sequoyah and Native participation
in Oklahoma’s statehood process was the assumption, currently being tested
before the U.S. Supreme Court, that statehood disestablished the tribes’ reservations.82 This idea had its echo in the two most recent states admitted to
the Union, Alaska and Hawaii. Depending on the measure used, both states
have the highest proportion of indigenous citizens of any state in the
union,83 and in both instances admission required grappling with the status
77. See generally SIDNEY L HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRILAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994).
78. See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES (1940); RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865–1896, 635–40 (2017).
79. ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT VISIONS OF POWER AND
COMMUNITY 155–78 (2014); Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or Mixed Blessing: Tribal Sovereignty and the State
of Sequoyah, 43 TULSA L. REV. 13 (2007).
80. See generally CONST. OF THE STATE OF SEQUOYAH (1905).
81. See DAVID W. LEVY, 1 THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 151 (2005) (arguing that
Sequoyah was “probably doomed . . . by the reluctance of the Republican administration and the Republican Congress . . . to admit another staunchly Democratic state”); PRUCHA, supra note 71, at 302–09.
82. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 86 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. May
21, 2018) (No. 17-1107).
83. Demographics, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/
KB88-KACG; 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS, THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION: 2010 (2012).
BAL
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and claims of these indigenous populations.84 Yet in both cases, the result
of statehood was the triumph of assimilationist logic that ensured that two
states’ Native communities enjoy fewer rights under federal law than the
federally recognized Native communities in other states.85 In this sense, the
logic of state authority advanced during Removal finally reached its most
lasting expression.
B. Today
The paradox of the present is that, even though there are no longer
proposals for the creation of a separate Native state (in contrast, for instance, with the recent Canadian establishment of an Inuit-run territory in
Nunavut86), Native nations and states are arguably more similar now than in
the past. This shift reflects important changes in both federalism and Indian
law. States, as federalism scholars have emphasized, are no longer separate
sovereigns ruling their own domains: they are now bound up with a dramatically expanded federal administrative state, in which they exert what scholars have called the “power of the servant” to influence policy from the
inside.87 For their part, tribes, while still subject to federal plenary power,
now enjoy the benefit of a federal policy of self-determination, which has
affirmed, through repeated executive orders, the government-to-government
relationship.88 Within the executive branch as well as in Congress, then,
states and tribes share some similarity: both are sovereign stakeholders with
whom federal agencies are mandated to consult before enacting policies
that affect them. And, by virtue of the Spending Clause and the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Act, both states and tribes have increasingly
become the local administrators, under federal guidelines, of federal programs dispersing funds from the national treasury.89 Some corners of federal law, particularly environmental law, have in fact codified the tribe-state
84. See, e.g., Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971); Hawaii
Admission Act, Pub. L. 86-3, § 4, 73 Stat. 4, 5 (1959).
85. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,
522 U.S. 520 (1998).
86. Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c 28 (Can.); see also Anthony Depalma, A New State for Inuit: Frigid
but Optimistic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1999), at 1.
87. E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Abbe R.
Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law
as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023–2110 (2008).
88. Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS: 1970, at 564 (Jul. 8, 1970);
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304
(2000), reprinted in 25 U.S.C. § 450 app. at 531–33 (2012); Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov.
5, 2009).
89. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2015); see
also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing the role of states in
administering federally funded programs).
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analogy. The Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act
all expressly grant the EPA administrator “to treat Indian tribes as States”
for the purposes of establishing environmental standards within Indian
country,90 and the EPA has interpreted other statutes as granting similar
authority.91 Courts have upheld this tribal authority against challenges.92
This similarity does not mean that tribes and states now enjoy equal
power. Because the many proposals for Native representation in Congress
came to naught, Native nations have never enjoyed the benefit of the “political safeguards of federalism,” which proved strikingly consequential in Indian affairs.93 As Removal highlights, states often got the federal government to back their claims against Native nations by flexing their political
and electoral power. But the rise of the federal administrative state and
growth in the scope and effectiveness of tribes’ lobbying have made the
long-standing contest between tribes and states for federal support slightly
more equal. The recent conflicts over Bears Ears, Dakota Access, and treaty
fishing rights suggest that tribes can sometimes get a sympathetic administration to back their interests against those of the states—even as subsequent events underscore how tenuous, fragile, and dependent on partisan
politics such outcomes are.94
The Supreme Court has also been drawn to the tribe-state analogy in
recent years, but for very different reasons. For many of the Justices, the
most striking fact about Native nations is that they are not states, and so do
not fit cleanly within constitutional categories. Justice Kennedy, for instance, has emphasized that the Constitution established a “federal structure” constituted solely of states and the federal government, reducing tribes
to a “historical exception” whose authority is predicated on tribal members’
consent.95 “[T]he States (unlike the tribes) are part of a constitutional
framework that allocates sovereignty between the State and Federal Governments,” Justice Thomas opined in the same case, reiterating, “The tribes,
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2013); 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2013).
91. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136u (2012).
92. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
94. See Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (per curiam) (mem.); Julie Turkewitz,
Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), at A1,
available at https://perma.cc/2PSZ-KUYB (discussing how President Trump has ordered the diminishment of the Bears Ears national monument boundaries established by President Obama); Brian Naylor,
Trump Gives Green Light To Keystone, Dakota Access Pipelines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 24, 2017),
available at https://perma.cc/VED5-WCKX (reporting on President Trump’s decision to reverse President Obama’s orders halting the construction of both the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines).
95. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order.”96 In subsequent cases,
Thomas has gone still further and revived the zero-sum language of the
Removal era, insisting that tribal authority represents a derogation from an
imagined right of total state territorial sovereignty.97
The Court’s use of a state yardstick to measure the shortcomings of
tribal sovereignty has important doctrinal consequences. During the oral argument in Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Choctaw Tribe,98 for
instance, several Justices focused on the absence of any procedure for removal from tribal court or for the U.S. Supreme Court to review tribal court
judgments.99 These omissions, these Justices implied, supported the negative inference that neither Congress nor the drafters of the Constitution anticipated that Native nations would exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers
of the tribe, since this was at odds with the Constitution’s promise of a
“neutral forum” to resolve disputes.
This odd counterfactual relied on a strikingly anachronistic understanding of both Indian law and federalism. The drafters of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not think of tribes as akin to states: as noted above, they
thought of them primarily as akin to foreign nations, and perhaps even
outside the scope of federal jurisdiction, and so were hardly likely to extend
a removal statute to them. Moreover, in valorizing the restraints of federal
due process within state courts, the Justices rely on a model of federalism
sharply at odds with U.S. history and practice. Most restrictions of the Bill
of Rights did not apply to the states until the 1920s at the earliest,100 only
forty years before most constitutional restrictions were extended to encompass tribes;101 in both instances, some rights have not been incorporated.
And it is hard to argue that U.S. Supreme Court review of state supreme
court judgments provides a particularly meaningful restraint on state courts,
given that the Court reviews a tiny fraction of such appeals.102
96. Id. at 218–19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1662 (2018) (recognizing tribal
sovereign immunity “would contradict the bedrock principle that each State is ‘entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits’ ” (quoting Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. 212, 228 (1845) (Thomas, J., dissenting))); Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, cert.
denied, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372, 374 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (attacking an interpretation of the Indian
Commerce Clause as “giving Congress the power to destroy the States’ territorial integrity”).
98. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
99. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dollar General Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
100. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment protection
of free speech into the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (incorporating the right to free exercise of religion).
101. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
102. In the past term, the Court heard 74 cases total, eight of which were of state supreme court
decisions. See, e.g., StatPack: October Term 2017, SCOTUSBLOG, available at https://perma.cc/RCC6XJT3. According to Westlaw, there were 539 petitions from state supreme courts to the Supreme Court
that term, for a grant rate of 1.5%. See WESTLAW (search (“Petition #for writ #of certiorari #to the” +S
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As these examples suggest, there is a strong appeal in analogizing
tribes and states—formally, the only two subnational sovereigns within the
United States. Yet the prospect of statehood has always represented a Faustian bargain for Native peoples: it promised to place Native sovereignty and
self-government on a clearer constitutional footing, but at the cost of those
aspects of Native governance that make Native nations indigenous.103 For
good reasons, states lack the authority to deviate from majoritarian national
norms or to define their own membership, yet both powers are arguably
central to what it means to be Native. It is unsurprising, then, that most
proposals for Native statehood in U.S. history were, at root, assimilative,
coming either from non-Natives seeking to tame Native sovereignty or, in
the case of Sequoyah, from Native leaders seeking to use any available
legal tool to preserve a modicum of sovereignty under federal law. States
might be, as Justices Kennedy and Thomas insist, on firmer constitutional
ground, but they are also, in important ways, less than tribes. However
credible some scholars’ claims that states are more than mere arbitrary administrative units,104 states do not and cannot have the same ties to place
nor the same claim to status as a distinct people as indigenous peoples who
have lived there since time immemorial. In this sense, indigenous statehood
would be a loss more than a gain. As the Tenth Circuit opined in 1959,
“Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that of
states.”105
IV.

TERRITORIES

A. Historically
The third sovereign routinely invoked in comparison to tribes is not,
formally speaking, a sovereign at all: the U.S. territories. Yet, from the beginning of the United States, the status of Native nations within its borders
has been complicatedly bound up with the federal government’s power over
territory.106
(“Supreme Court of” OR “Supreme Judicial Court” OR “Supreme Court #of Appeals” OR “Court of
Appeals of New York” OR “Court of Appeals of Maryland” OR “Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia”) +S denied) & DATE (aft 09-30-2017)).
103. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. LAW REV. 799, 835–47
(2007).
104. Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture
in the American Federal System (2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://perma.cc/AA47X4FV.
105. Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959).
106. See generally John Dossett, Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington’s Promise at
the Framing 68 AM. L. REV. 205 (2018).
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Territory, both historically and today, is an evocative word with multiple meanings. At least three distinct definitions of the term operated in Anglo-American debates over Native status: territory as the formally organized
jurisdictions outside the states and under federal control (the “U.S. territories”); territory as property owned by the federal government, wherever situated; and territory in an international-law sense, as all the land within the
borders of the United States. But, while conceptually distinct, in practice
Anglo-Americans routinely blurred the boundaries between these understandings of territory. In fact, the conflation of these three meanings, often
in a single court decision, provided a powerful intellectual tool for expanding federal authority over Native nations.
The first meaning of territory, as a jurisdiction outside the states administered by the federal government, is a term of art tracing to early debates over how the United States should govern westward expansion. After
the American Revolution, states ceded their western land claims to the federal government, with the stipulation that these lands would eventually be
admitted as coequal states.107 The question then became how these jurisdictions would be governed prior to statehood. The solution, codified in the
Northwest Ordinance, was the creation of temporary, federally run territorial governments that would administer a given territory until admitted as a
state.108 The Constitution blessed this solution by granting Congress the
power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations” for these federal territories.109
From the beginning, governance of the U.S. territories and what was
known as “Indian affairs” were intertwined. The early territories were
vast—the first territory, the Northwest Territory, encompassed nearly the
entire present-day Midwest through Minnesota—and were barely inhabited
by Anglo-Americans.110 Nearly all of the territories remained, both in practice and under federal law, Indian country, owned and governed by Native
nations.111 The converse was also true: most Indian country, and Native
people, in the early United States fell within the federal territories.112 Consequently, it became easy to think of territorial governance and Indian affairs as synonymous. Federal law reinforced this view: the Northwest Ordi107. See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES
UNITED STATES, 1775–1787, at 4–39 (1983).
108. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 334–43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
109. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
110. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
58–66 (1987); Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631, 643–44 (2018).
111. See Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 1, 16, 1 Stat. 469, 469–73 (1796) (defining a border
between the United States and Native nations and defining “the Indian country, over and beyond the said
boundary line”).
112. Id.
IN THE
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nance contained specific provisions governing Indian affairs and mandating
the “utmost good faith . . . towards the Indians.”113 There was also significant overlap in personnel. Federally appointed territorial governors were ex
officio federal superintendents of Indian affairs, charged with negotiating
treaties with, and at times leading military campaigns against, Native nations.114 This charge arguably became the governors’ most substantial, and
onerous, governmental responsibility.115
The U.S. territories were distinctive because, in an era marked by intense confrontations over the scope of federal and state authority, they were
acknowledged as an exclusively federal space entirely outside state control.
The antebellum Supreme Court repeatedly upheld Congress’s sweeping
power to administer the territories as it saw fit, emphasizing that in the
territories the federal government enjoyed all the powers of both the national and state governments.116 One North Carolina Senator suggested that
this exclusion of state authority, particularly over Indian affairs, was the
primary impetus for the creation of the territorial system in the first place:
state cessions, he suggested, were “only desireable in as much as the clashing claims and encroachments of the St[ates] on their Constitutional powers
are thereby silenced and the government freed from the disgrace and expences enivitably attendant on disputes with the Indians.”117 The idea that
the federal government possessed the sole constitutional authority outside
state borders also served to justify federal assertions of power over Indian
affairs. In defending the provisions of the Trade and Intercourse Act that
punished crimes by U.S. citizens in Indian country, for instance, some in
Congress insisted that “the power of the General Government to legislate in
all the territory belonging to the Union, not within the limits of any particular State, cannot be doubted.”118
113. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 340.
114. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XIV, 1 Stat. 123 (1790) (“And the powers, duties, and emoluments of a Superintendant of Indian Affairs for the Southern department, shall be united with those of
the Governor”); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Francis Hamtramck (May 23, 1799), in THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. III, THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER
OHIO, 1787–1803, CONTINUED 24, 24–25 (Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1934) (“You are aware that the
Governors of the North Western Territory and of the Missisippi Territory are severally ex officio Superintendants of Indian Affairs . . . . [T]hey are to be the organs of all negociations and communications
between the Indians and the Government”).
115. See, e.g., Letter from William Blount to John Gray Blount (June 26, 1790), in 2 THE JOHN
GRAY BLOUNT PAPERS 67, 67–72 (Alice Barnwell Keith ed., 1959) (William Blunt, the Governor of the
Southwest Territory at the time, noted, “The duties of Governor I should not mind they will be easy
enough but those of Superintendent of Indian Affairs will be laborious and disagreeable”).
116. See, e.g., Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. 332 (1810); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 542
(1828); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235 (1850).
117. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to William Blount (Apr. 24, 1792), Folder 4: 1792, William
Blount Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
118. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (1792).
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Yet this quote hints at a second meaning of territory at the time—
“territory” as land owned by the United States, that is, where the federal
government itself held title as proprietor. The language of the Constitution
suggested this conflation, since it granted Congress power over “the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”119 The same constitutional Clause, in short, authorized federal authority not only over the federal territories but over federal public lands wherever situated, and the Supreme Court freely cited precedents from the two contexts
interchangeably.120
This overlap between questions of property and jurisdiction had important implications for Indian affairs, where such conflation was already rife:
“[I]n the discussion of our Indian relations, the claims to soil and to sovereignty, have been confounded as identical,” one Tennessee Supreme Court
Justice would later complain.121 Early on, the federal government asserted a
quasi-property right in Native lands by claiming the right of preemption, the
sole right to purchase land from Native nations.122 Many commentators
went further and suggested that Native peoples were actually federal tenants, with the underlying title held by Anglo-Americans.123 In Johnson v.
M’Intosh,124 Chief Justice Marshall endorsed that view, concluding that the
United States possessed fee title by virtue of discovery while Native peoples retained only the right of occupancy.125 The consequence of this ruling
was that all Native lands became a kind of federal property, since the federal government held the underlying title, regardless of whether those lands
fell within the boundaries of a state government.
These meanings of territory, as federal property and within federal jurisdiction, flowed from the Constitution’s language. Yet they existed alongside a third meaning of territory derived principally from international
law—territory as all the land within a nation’s internationally recognized

119. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840) (citing the Court’s precedents concerning the territories to uphold the proposition that federal power over federal property is “without
limitation”).
121. State v. Forman, 16 Tenn. 256, 275 (1835).
122. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790).
123. See Address and Remonstrance of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, Aug. 9,
1796, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 625–26 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., Gales & Seaton 1832) (describing the land’s Native inhabitants as “tenants at will”); see
also STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 150–89
(2005) (describing the shift from conceptions of Indians as owners to the claim that they were simply
“occupants”).
124. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
125. Id. at 574.
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borders.126 This meaning proved highly significant for Anglo-Americans’
thinking about Native status. Native nations, they reasoned, fell within the
boundaries of the United States as defined in the 1783 Treaty of Paris.127
Although there was considerable debate about what rights, exactly, flowed
from this jurisdictional fact, there was near-universal agreement among Anglo-Americans that the United States enjoyed some authority over Native
peoples merely by virtue of the fact that they fell within the nation’s “territorial limits.”128 “The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the
United States,” Justice Marshall reasoned in proclaiming the Cherokees a
“domestic” nation.129 “In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our
commercial regulations, in any attempt at intercourse between Indians and
foreign nations, they are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the
United States.”130
What united these three distinct meanings of “territory”—as federally
managed jurisdiction, as federal property, and as the space of entire nation—was that all suggested a broad scope of federal power, whether as
territorial government, as property owner, or as the repository for national
sovereignty. They provided, then, a ready tool for those seeking to expand
federal authority over Native nations, as officials freely invoked, and conflated, all three ideas of territory. Andrew Jackson, for instance, early on
argued for congressional power by casually equating the national territory
of the United States with the U.S. territories: “The Indians are the subjects
of United States, inhabit its territory and acknowledging its sovereignty
. . . . I have always thought, that Congress had as much right to regulate by
acts of Legislation all Indian concerns as they had of Territories.”131 A similar blurring occurred in United States v. Rogers.132 There, Jackson-appointee Chief Justice Taney relied on all three conceptions of territory to
uphold a broad assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction. First noting that
Europeans had not “regarded [tribes] as the owners of the territories they
respectively occupied,” Taney concluded: “[W]e think it too firmly and
clearly established to admit of dispute, that the Indian tribes residing within
the territorial limits of the United States are subject to their authority, and

126. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 214 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds.,
Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (“The whole space over which a nation extends its
government, becomes the seat of its jurisdiction, and is called its territory”).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Ablavsky, supra note 16, at 1063–64.
Id. at 1061–68.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
Id.
Letter from Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, supra note 18, at 95.
45 U.S. 567 (1846).
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where the country occupied by them is not within the limits of one of the
States, Congress may by law punish any offense committed there.”133
Jackson and Taney’s intermingling of these distinct meanings of territory ignored important differences between them, particularly concerning
geographical scope. Federally owned territory existed wherever the federal
government held title, and the “territorial limits” of the United States encompassed the whole nation, yet the U.S. territories definitionally existed
only outside of states. This distinction arguably mattered little at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the three sources of power largely
overlapped. Yet the differences among them became increasingly important
by the century’s end, when erstwhile territories throughout the U.S. West
became states containing large Native populations.134 If federal power over
Indian affairs was predicated on congressional power over the U.S. territories, as the earlier rhetoric might suggest, then there was a substantial question over whether that authority could persist after statehood. Early on, new
states like Alabama and Tennessee had insisted that it could not,135 and, by
the late nineteenth century, federal courts began to agree with them, holding
that statehood, and particularly the promise that newly admitted states
would be on an “equal footing” with existing states, stripped aspects of
federal power over Indian affairs.136 Congress attempted to foreclose these
arguments by requiring new states to disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands
and people on admission to the union,137 but the Court distinguished those
disclaimers as not altering jurisdictional boundaries.138 This equal footing
claim was implausible on its face—the Supreme Court had, after all, already held that the original states lacked jurisdiction in Indian country.139
Such a legally questionable claim could nonetheless gain widespread currency because, for much of the nineteenth century, Anglo-American jurisprudence had unthinkingly conflated Indian and territorial affairs.
In United States v. Kagama,140 however, the Court mitigated much of
the force behind the equal footing argument by, ironically, doubling down
on the language of territoriality.141 In determining the constitutionality of a
133. Id. at 572.
134. See HARRING, supra note 77, at 44–53.
135. See Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & P. 327, 351 (Ala. 1832) (Saffold, J., concurring); State v.
Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 329 (1835).
136. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881);
United States v. Ward, 28 F.Cas. 397 (Cir. Ct. D. Kan. 1863).
137. See generally David E. Wilkins, Tribal-State Affairs: American States as ‘Disclaiming’ Sovereigns, 28 PUBLIUS 55 (1998) (describing the creation of jurisdictional disclaimers in states’ acts of
admission).
138. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
139. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
140. 110 U.S. 375 (1886).
141. Id. at 379.
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federal statute that applied to inter-Indian crime in California, the Court
noted that the offense was committed “within a state, and not within a territory,” which, it observed, was a novel claim of federal authority.142 Yet the
Court waved this distinction away. Extensively citing precedents concerning the U.S. territories, the Court once again conflated all three meanings of
territory, at once invoking federal authority derived from “ownership of the
country,” from the “power of congress to organize territorial governments,
and make laws for their inhabitants,” and from Indians’ presence “within
the geographical limits of the United States.”143 By extending the multiple
meanings of territorial authority to lands within state borders, the Court ensured that the federal government would continue to enjoy broad power
over Indian affairs even after statehood. Although the Court still fitfully
endorsed equal footing arguments in subsequent cases, Kagama provided a
powerful tool for beating back state challenges to federal authority within
their borders.144
Kagama also played another role in endorsing expansive federal
power: legalizing the United States’ foray into formal overseas imperialism.
As Sarah Cleveland has charted, federal efforts to claim authority over its
newly conquered overseas territories—Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines,
and Cuba—drew extensively on the legal principles established to govern
Native peoples within the United States.145 In this instance, the line of legal
influence was reversed, as federal power over Indian affairs, long derived
from territorial thought, became a source for claiming sweeping authority
over newly colonized peoples unconstrained by the protections of the U.S.
Constitution. In the most important of the so-called Insular Cases, Downes
v. Bidwell,146 the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution did not
necessarily apply in the territories of its own force.147 Justice Brown’s majority cited Johnson v. M’Intosh at length,148 while the case’s most influential opinion, Justice White’s concurrence crafting a doctrine of selective
142. Id. at 380.
143. Id. at 379–380.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591
(1916).
145. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2 (2002)
(describing the interconnections between plenary power over Indian affairs and the territories); see also
RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND EMPIRE BUILDING (1980)
(tracing the links between anti-Indian rhetoric and U.S. overseas imperialism).
146. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
147. Id. at 244. For background on the Insular Cases, see RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE, (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015);
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
148. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 281.
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incorporation, twice cited Kagama as endorsing the “plentitude of the
power of Congress” over federal territories.149
The irony of Downes v. Bidwell is that it extended the territorial logic
of Indian affairs overseas just as that link was being severed in the continental United States: with the early twentieth-century admissions of
Oklahoma,150 New Mexico,151 and Arizona,152 there were no more federal
territories in the contiguous United States. The federal government, too,
increasingly sought to devolve the federal authority upheld in Kagama back
to the states whose jurisdictional claims the Court had rejected.153 Today,
all federally recognized tribes exist within the boundaries of a state,154 and,
although numerous indigenous peoples live within the U.S. territories, they
are not legally considered “Indians” under U.S. law.155 Moreover, much of
the land within Indian country is not owned by the federal government, or
even by the tribe.156 The federal government’s status as territorial sovereign, of course, endures, but the claim that territorial sovereignty alone
might confer federal authority outside of the Constitution’s enumerated
powers would be a difficult one under current law.157
The result is that, although courts still occasionally cite the Property
Clause to justify federal authority in Indian country,158 this invocation is
vestigial. Like the analogy to foreign nations, it reflects a jurisprudential
world that has faded. Unlike the analogy to foreign nations, the doctrine
that invocations of territory supported—nearly unlimited federal power
over the lives and affairs of Indian people—survives largely unchanged,
though the Court has subbed in the Indian Commerce Clause to justify this

149. Id. at 290 (White, J., concurring).
150. Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
151. New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
152. Id.
153. See Act of Aug. 25, 1953, Pub. L. 83-280, Stat. (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326).
154. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 4235 (Jan. 30, 2018).
155. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (defining indigenous as “native to the continental United States,” which is
limited to “the contiguous 48 states and Alaska”). The Department of Interior recently enacted regulations that would permit federal recognition of a Native Hawaiian Governing Entity, but its provisions are
limited solely to Hawaii. See 43 C.F.R. § 50.4 (defining a Native Hawaiian as a descendent of the
aboriginal people of “the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii”).
156. See Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
157. See Cleveland, supra note 145, at 14 (“The nineteenth century history of the inherent powers
doctrine reveals that the doctrine cannot be justified by mainstream forms of constitutional analysis”).
158. 1-5 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 5.01 (2017); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal
Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 210 n.73 (1984).
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authority.159 But the changes wrought by the twentieth century have made
this authority seem puzzling, or even incoherent, within present law.160
B. Today
Federal power over the territories may no longer provide much direct
support for federal authority in Indian affairs, but the two doctrines’ shared
origins mean that the similarities between the status of Native nations and
the U.S. territories under formal law are striking. Like Indian country, the
U.S. territories today enjoy considerable autonomy under their own constitutions and elected officials, yet, like tribes and unlike states, they are subject to federal plenary power.161 Like tribes, the territories enjoy sovereign
immunity in federal court as a matter of federal common law rather than the
Eleventh Amendment.162
Perhaps the most fundamental congruence between tribes and the territories rests in what they are not—states.163 In both cases, this difference
gets expressed throughout the language of exception and anomaly. Doctrinally, the territories, like Native nations, are “extraconstitutional” in the
sense that many basic constitutional protections do not apply there of their
own force.164 Most, though not all, residents of the territories are U.S. citizens,165 but, like Indians, their citizenship derives from statute rather than
159. See Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of
the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs.”). Ironically, it was largely because of the perceived limitations of this Clause that the Kagama
Court relied on ideas about territorial sovereignty to justify federal plenary power. See United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (describing the invocation of the Indian Commerce Clause to justify
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country as a “very strained construction”).
160. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
161. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 n.3 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Congress
has plenary power over . . . the territories”); United States v. Lebron-Caceres, 157 F. Supp. 3d 80, 97
(citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)) (“[T]erritorial governments are entirely a
creation of Congress”).
162. See Marx v. Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 297–98 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court and this court
have recognized that territorial governments have a form of inherent or common law sovereign immunity”); see also Consejo de Salud de la Comunidad de la Playa de Ponce, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Feliciano,
695 F.3d 83, 103 n.15 (1st Cir. 2012); Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unindentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Vessel, 857 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 n.10 (D.V.I. 1994).
163. Cf. Developments in the Law - The U.S. Territories, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1616, 1632–56 (2016)
(proposing a model of “territorial federalism,” even while noting that “different rules apply” for territories than for states).
164. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (summarizing the “doctrine of territorial
incorporation, under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for
statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories.”).
165. See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding the exclusion of American Samoans from U.S. citizenship).
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from the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Similarly, although
both Native nations and the territories are bound by most of the restrictions
of the Bill of Rights, this limitation comes largely through congressional
discretion to extend or withhold certain rights, and the constitutional protections afforded need not match the rights enjoyed against states “jot-forjot.”167
For the territories as for the tribes, their status as “extraconstitutional”
sovereigns distinct from states has represented an opportunity as well as a
challenge. Home to large indigenous populations, many territories have
sought, similarly to Native nations, to maintain their indigeneity by enacting laws that use ancestry to delineate property rights and political participation.168 These laws, and the legal challenges surrounding them, closely
resemble ongoing controversies in federal Indian law, to which they have
frequently been analogized.169 Both the territories and Native nations, then,
present a similar problem to the U.S. constitutional order—how far distinct
communities may deviate from the norms that constrain state and federal
governments.170
The tribe-territory analogy is not perfect. In some respects, territories
enjoy more extensive authority than tribes under federal law. This is especially true in the realm of jurisdiction, where territories, unlike tribes, possess the unquestioned right to subject anyone within their territory, regardless of citizenship, to their legislative and adjudicatory authority. This di166. Compare, e.g., Jones-Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (making Puerto Ricans U.S.
citizens) with Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (conferring U.S. citizenship on “all
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States”); see also Bethany R. Berger,
Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1185, 1185–1258 (2016) (describing the history explaining the exclusion of Indians from citizenship).
167. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); see Torres v. Commw. of
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 470 (1979) (“Congress may make constitutional provisions applicable to
territories in which they would not otherwise be controlling.”).
168. See Davis v. Commw. Election Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) (invalidating restriction
of voting rights in the Northern Mariana Islands to individuals of “Northern Marianas Descent”); Wabol
v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding ancestry-based restrictions on land ownership
in the Northern Marianas by concluding that ordinary Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine
did not govern by virtue of the Insular Cases); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 163, at
1680–1703 (“While the Insular Cases were originally conceived as instruments of American expansion
. . . they have today been reclaimed to serve as bulwarks for cultural preservation.”); but see Rose
Cuison Villazor, Problematizing the Protection of Culture and the Insular Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. F.
127, 146–50 (2017) (noting some of the limitations of this approach).
169. See Davis, 844 F.3d at 1094 (rejecting analogy between Northern Mariana Islands residents and
members of federally recognized tribes).
170. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799 (2007);
Rogers M. Smith, The Insular Cases, Differentiated Citizenship, and Territorial Statuses in the TwentyFirst Century, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES, supra note 147, at 103; Rose Cuison Villazor,
Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801
(2008).
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vergence likely reflects the fact that the territories look more “normal” to
outside observers: that is, they look more like states.171 Because the territories are not indigenous polities, belonging and jurisdiction rest on territorial
presence rather membership.172 Moreover, many of the territories fit more
cleanly into the well-established structures of federalism. Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands, for instance, all possesses
a dual court system—a federal territorial court (in Puerto Rico’s case, an
Article III court) alongside a local court system, from which litigants can
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.173
But, if the territories enjoy greater practical authority than tribes, they
differ from Native nations because they are not considered sovereigns under
federal law, at least for the purpose of double jeopardy. In the 2016 case of
Sanchez Valle,174 the Supreme Court assessed whether Puerto Rico could
enjoy the benefits of the “dual sovereignty” exception to the bar on double
jeopardy, which permits multiple governments to prosecute an offender for
the same offense so long as their fundamental authority derives from distinct sources.175 The Court has long recognized that tribes, states, and the
federal government are all separate sovereigns under this test,176 but not,
the Court ruled in Sanchez Valle, Puerto Rico: the territory’s authority, unlike that enjoyed by tribes and states, was still delegated federal sovereignty.177
Although Sanchez Valle ultimately placed tribes and territories into opposing categories, the logic it employed should be familiar to Indian law
scholars. Puerto Rico, as the facts suggested, is a complicated case: just as it
had routinely done for states prior to their admission to the union, Congress
had authorized the territory to create a constitution based on popular sovereignty that provided for self-governance.178 Yet Congress did not then admit Puerto Rico to statehood. The result was that the territory, like tribes,
remained in a liminal space within federalism. The Court resolved this challenge of history by ignoring it, instead adopting a highly formal test that
collapsed authority back into clean conceptual categories of the federal government, states, and foreign nations.179 Such formalistic reasoning among
171. See Developments in the Law - The U.S. Territories, supra note 163, at 1632 (“[T]he federalterritory relationship has more or less gradually progressed toward functionally mimicking the federalstate structural relationship.”).
172. Although, in some instances, non-indigenous residents’ rights to vote and own land may be
limited. See Cleveland, supra note 145 and accompanying text.
173. See Territorial Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, available at https://perma.cc/SG64-LBFJ.
174. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
175. Id. at 1867.
176. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
177. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1876.
178. Id. at 1869.
179. Id. at 1871–73.
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sovereigns is the staple of many Indian law cases in which the Court has
slowly chipped away at the scope of tribal authority. Unsurprisingly, Justice
Thomas, the Court’s most vocal proponent of pushing tribes into supposedly more coherent jurisprudential boxes, concurred to argue that Native
nations, too, should no longer be considered sovereign for the purposes of
Double Jeopardy.180
Although Sanchez Valle’s practical implications were limited to
double jeopardy doctrine—ironically, the purportedly non-sovereign territories retain greater jurisdictional rights under federal law than sovereign
tribes—the Supreme Court’s examination of the “deepest wellsprings” of
sovereignty was nonetheless symbolically significant.181 As one Puerto Rican commentator observed, the ruling “insult[s] our pride as self-governing
United States citizens.”182 Sadly, such dignitary harms in Supreme Court
rulings are deeply familiar to the members of Native nations.
Ultimately, it is this similarity in the attitude of contemporary jurisprudence that makes the comparison between Native nations and the U.S. territories particularly apt. The law that applies to both the territories and the
tribes is the shared legacy of U.S. empire. Emphasizing this fact is more
than a way to signal moral disapproval; it is key to understanding the central logic of both bodies of law. Empires, scholars have emphasized, operate
on the fundamental principle that “different peoples within the polity will
be governed differently.”183 The Supreme Court enabled this differential
treatment by repeatedly carving out geographical and political exceptions to
the constitutional doctrines that supposedly governed the United States. The
Court aggrandized federal power and stripped away constraints, relying particularly on asserted racial differences and the supposed incapacity of the
nation’s imperial subjects to justify this uneven approach.184
This legacy has had paradoxical consequences in the present. On the
one hand, these imperial precedents endure as formal law, as the Court has
managed to abstract them from their unabashedly racist origins and treat
them as a matter of settled law.185 On the other hand, the imperial logic of
differential treatment no longer seems intelligible within a contemporary
jurisprudence deeply committed to principles of formal equality of both
180. Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 1871.
182. Rafael Matos, Opinion, Puerto Rico’s Rude Awakening, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 20, 2018,
available at https://perma.cc/QY6V-8JGM.
183. JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE 8 (2010).
184. See Cleveland, supra note 145, at 258–67.
185. Id. at 278. (“The Supreme Court has spent much of the past century repackaging the inherent
powers doctrines into traditional enumerated categories without significant change to the underlying
holdings.”).
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sovereigns and citizens. Both the territories and Native nations strike the
present Court as constitutional anomalies, puzzles of sovereignty that the
Justices keep attempting to shove into what they perceive as “normal” constitutional structures—and repeatedly failing, precisely because both are
built on imperial histories of difference. This challenge will likely remain
irresolvable as long as the Court continues to imagine empire and its legacies as outside the broader U.S. constitutional tradition rather than fundamental to it.
V. CONCLUSION
Anomaly and exception presume the existence of some “normal” order. Yet, as the dissent in Sanchez Valle sought to underscore, sovereigns
are not naturally occurring, notwithstanding widespread efforts to naturalize
their authority.186 Nation-states, as a wealth of historical scholarship has
demonstrated, were a highly artificial, self-consciously constructed model
for political organization.187 As for federalism, its status as an invented ideology is not only acknowledged but celebrated in American civic and constitutional culture.188 Native nations are no different; though rooted in deep
indigenous ties between peoples and lands, they too grew, developed, and
became nations through self-conscious creation and change.189 All these
sovereigns—nation, state, and tribe—appear in the Constitution’s text,190
yet in none of these cases did the sparse language dictate something as
complicated as a fully elaborated constitutional structure. Justices Kennedy
and Thomas seem to measure constitutionality based on the number and
specificity of a concept’s appearance in the constitutional text (a test that
would render slavery three times more constitutional than, say, freedom of
186. Commw. of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., BENEDICT R. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006); DAVID A. BELL, THE CULT OF THE NATION IN FRANCE: INVENTING NATIONALISM, 1680–1800 (2003); LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION, 1707–1837
(3d ed. 2009). On the construction of the United States as a nation, see CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG,
THIS VIOLENT EMPIRE: THE BIRTH OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1776–1820
(1997).
188. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery”); see also ALISON L LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010) (describing the construction of federalism as an ideology in the
early United States).
189. See, e.g., STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE CREEK NATION, 1670–1763 (2004); WILLIAM GERALD MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1986); Claudio Saunt,
Telling Stories: The Political Uses of Myth and History in the Cherokee and Creek Nations, 93 J. AM.
HIST. 673 (2006).
190. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8 cl. 3.
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speech or equal protection).191 Yet the constitutional text was merely the
start for centuries of dialogue, contestation, and experimentation over sovereignty that the Court shorthands as “history and structure.”192 As this Article has underscored, from the nation’s very foundation, this history has
involved all three sovereigns.
Acknowledging this shared history of construction suggests that none
of these sovereigns has a greater claim to normative status than any other.
To be sure, power and authority are arrayed unequally among them, producing conflict. In this context, analogies and comparisons among sovereigns
are not only unavoidable, but useful. But the language of exception and
anomaly does more: it smuggles in ideas about legitimacy. Little surprise,
then, that one of the primary uses of such comparisons in Indian law has
been to construct narratives about tribal shortcomings. In this sense, older
ideas about the hierarchy of peoples and civilizations, the intellectual core
of imperialism, never vanished; they were just laundered through the purportedly neutral language of modern jurisprudence.

191. Compare U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; § 8, cl. 1; Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 with id. Amend. I; Amend.
XIV.
192. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999).
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